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Prying Open the Japanese Market: Tender
Offers and the Legal System in Japan
I. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese have been actively investing in the United States
for the last several years. The United States' huge trade deficit with
Japan has created an atmosphere of tension between the two countries
causing Japanese businesses to fear that the United States government
will impose quotas or embargoes against Japanese products. To pre-
empt such retaliatory measures by the United States government, Ja-
pan has changed its method of investment in the United States. In the
past, Japanese manufacturers typically built their businesses from the
ground up by purchasing real estate, building factories, and hiring
employees.' However, as the fear of embargoes and other retaliatory
measures against Japanese products becomes more imminent, Japa-
nese businesses have turned to mergers and acquisitions as ways to
invest in the United States. 2 The soaring value of the yen against the
United States' dollar 3 is another factor that has fueled this trend.4
While Japanese investment in the United States has been ex-
tremely profitable, United States investment in Japan is not as viable
for economic, legal and cultural reasons. Why is foreign acquisition
of Japanese companies so rare, so difficult and so unthinkable? The
assessment of the current feasibility of United States investment in
Japan is almost uniformly negative among various commentators. In-
deed, one commentator stated recently that an acquisition of a Japa-
nese company was "undoubtedly the most difficult form of entry into
1. Misawa, Merger and Acquisition Activities in Japan: The Present and the Future, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 785, 795 (1986).
2. Japanese corporations seek to acquire United States corporations as if they were
hunting for a "bargain sale." Y. TAKENAKA, MERGER & ACQUISITION KIGY0 BAISH0
SENRYAKU: M&A NI YORU ATARASHII KIGYO SEICHO (MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRAT-
EGY: NEW CORPORATE GROWTH BY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS) 4 (1987).
3. Recent reports indicate that the depreciating dollar has an effect on Americans. One
newspaper comments that the dollar buys about half the Japanese yen as it did in 1985. L.A.
Times, Nov. 14, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1. On November, 13, 1987, foreign exchange listed 135.85
yen to a United States dollar. Id., § 4 (Business), at 10, col. 2.
4. NIHON MEDIA PURAN, KIGY6 M&A NO TETTE1 KENKYU (CORPORATE MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS COMPLETE RESEARCH) 387 (1987) [hereinafter CORPORATE MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS].
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the Japanese market."' 5 Another commentator observed that "acqui-
sitions and takeovers are simply not an effective device for Americans
to enter the Japanese market."' 6 Yet another commentator has la-
mented that acquiring a Japanese company is impossible. 7 Are these
views justified?
This Comment explores the legal and non-legal barriers to acqui-
sitions in Japan with an emphasis on tender offers by foreign inves-
tors. What price must the Japanese pay in order to keep up these
barriers? Are such barriers an intentional strategy devised by Japa-
nese bureaucrats or the natural consequence of cultural differences?
This Comment is comprised of four major parts. First, it sets
forth the legal obstacles to the acquisition of Japanese companies as
foreign investments. Second, this Comment examines the Japanese
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law,8 the Japanese Se-
curities and Exchange Law, 9 and the Japanese Commercial Code 0 to
determine the potential disadvantages suffered by foreign investors
who seek to purchase Japanese businesses. Third, social and cultural
barriers including the Japanese corporate practices relating to tender
offers are explored. Finally, this Comment answers the question of
whether the Japanese have deliberately erected legal barriers, or have
simply maintained them to augment existing cultural barriers. The
effect of these barriers appears to be that the Japanese domestic busi-
nesses are protected from being taken over by foreign investors.
II. ACQUISITIONS VERSUS NEW BUSINESSES
Most companies, regardless of where they do business, choose
acquisitions as a growth mechanism because acquisitions offer a
ready-made package of distribution networks, management teams and
employees. The conventional method of establishing a business, how-
ever, requires investors to purchase real estate, build a factory and an
5. E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPS., Feb. 15, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
6. Henderson, Access to the Japanese Market: Some Aspects of Foreign Exchange Con-
trols and Banking Law, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN
AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 131, 143 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura ed. 1985).
7. Crabb, The Reality of Extralegal Barriers to Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, 21
INT'L LAW. 97 (1987).
8. Gaikoku Kawase Oyobi Gaikoku Bdeki Kanri-hd (Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949, as amended in Law No. 70 of 1986 [hereinafter
FECL].
9. SH6KEN TORIHIKI H6 (Securities and Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948 [herein-
after Japanese SEL].
10. SH6H6 (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899.
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office, and hire workers. In essence, this is starting from the ground
up." In addition, the traditional way of establishing a business or a
market is time consuming. In manufacturing sectors, the result may
be that by the time a product is developed and a distribution system is
set up, consumers are ready for a new generation of products.1 2 Es-
tablishing a new business also requires energy, resources, and signifi-
cant capital. Thus, one advantage of corporate acquisitions is that
they save a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources which
are normally required in establishing a new business.
Strategically, acquiring an existing business in Japan may be
more sound than building one from the ground up since the latter
form of investment imposes difficulties not normally encountered in
the United States. First, distribution systems are quite complicated in
Japan. 3 Large manufacturers dominate both wholesale and retail
dealers to comprise closed and anti-competitive distribution sys-
tems. 1 4 Like any other network, a distribution system may be difficult
for a foreigner to build in a short time.' 5 Second, recruiting and hir-
ing experienced workers may be difficult since major corporations, in
most instances, have life time employment systems. 16 Most workers
expect to stay in one company for their entire lives and mobility in the
workplace is generally not a familiar concept in Japan. Third, real
estate prices in recent years have skyrocketed in Japan, 17 making
prime office space literally unavailable.18 Lastly, since articles 5619
11. Starting from scratch by purchasing land for office or factory building is called "green
field up." Misawa, supra note 1, at 795; ABEGGLEN, THE STRATEGY OF JAPANESE BUSINESS
127 (1984).
12. KOKUSAI KIGY6 BAISH0 HANDOBUKKU (INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & AcQuISI-
TIONS HANDBOOK) 387 (K. Ishizumi ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS] (an interview with Mr. K. Ishizumi, an attorney licensed in New York and
Japan and senior attorney in Chiyoda International Managment Legal Office, Tokyo, Japan).
13. "[T]he Japanese distribution system is so complex and exclusive that it has been a
trade barrier for marketing in Japan." Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade and Invest-
ment in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 372 (1986).
14. Iyori, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in LAW
AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 64 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura ed.
1985).
15. NIHON BOEKI SHINKOKAI, OPERATING A BUSINESS IN JAPAN 11 (1974). This diffi-
culty has an historical. root. The tripartite system of distribution between wholesaler and re-
tailer makes foreign products prohibitively expensive for the general consumers, thereby
comprising another obstacle for the foreign investor. See also, Henderson, supra note 6, at 145.
16. See ABEGGLEN, supra note 11; Henderson, supra note 6, at 145.
17. Schoenberger, For Japan, Gilded Age of Riches, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 1; Hiltzik, Japanese Feel the Squeeze as Land Prices Skyrocket, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1988,
§ 1, at 1, col. 5.
18. 1988 Tokyo Office Space Conditions, 15 Focus JAPAN 2-3 (July, 1988). Even before
19891
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and 5720 of the Japanese Commercial Code prohibit foreign corpora-
tions from merging with Japanese corporations, a foreign investor
may be required to acquire an entire company as an alternate form of
corporate consolidation. The remaining option for the United States
investors is to set up a Japanese subsidiary. Hence, if investors suc-
cessfully acquire an existing business in Japan, they will be able to
bypass many of the initial hurdles involved in establishing a business.
Further, acquiring an existing Japanese business is attractive be-
cause Japanese corporate stock is generally undervalued with respect
to the true worth of the corporate assets.21 A substantial portion of
many Japanese companies' assets are invested in real estate. When
the value of a corporation's shares is undervalued, that corporation
makes an attractive acquisition target because investors can acquire
more shares for their money. While this undervaluation has been rec-
tified to some extent in recent years, stocks still do not reflect their fair
market value.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF TENDER OFFERS IN JAPAN
When foreign investors seek to execute a tender offer in Japan,
they must first overcome legal obstacles established by the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law ("FECL") and the Japa-
nese Securities and Exchange Law ("Japanese SEL"). The Japanese
SEL applies equally to Japanese investors and foreign investors. But a
potential foreign tender offeror must also satisfy the requirements of
the FECL. As will be seen, the FECL imposes the most significant
barrier to potential foreign investors in Japan.
A. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
1. Direct Domestic Investments
22
The FECL governs acquisitions and takeovers by foreign inter-
ests in Japan. In 1979, the FECL was substantially amended23 such
the current surge in land prices, prime office locations were expensive and scarce. NIHON
B6EKI SHINKOKAI, OPERATING A BUSINESS IN JAPAN 20 (1974).
19. SHOH6, § 56.
20. SHOH6, § 57.
21. CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 4, at 27.
22. GAIKOKU KAWASE OYoBI GAIKOKU B6EKI KANRI-Ho (Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949 [hereinafter Old FECLI, ch. 5.
23. The bill for the "Law concerning partial amendment of the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Conrol Law" was presented to the Diet and passed on December 11, 1979.
LEGAL DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, COMMEN-
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that the Law Concerning Foreign Investment 24 was abrogated and ab-
sorbed into the FECL.25 The original principle behind the FECL had
been to prohibit all external transactions and to relax earlier prohibi-
tions eminating from cabinet orders and ministerial ordinances.
26
Although there had been a substantial liberalization through the
amendment of cabinet orders and ministerial ordinances for the
FECL, it was not until the amendment of the FECL that the approval
system was transformed into one based on the principle of freedom of
external transactions.2 7 Under this principle, all external transactions
are permitted unless there is a specific obligation to obtain a license or
secure approval.
28
The current chapter 529 governs the area of direct domestic in-
vestments which includes acquisitions by foreign interests. The
FECL charges that when a "foreign investor" engages in a direct do-
mestic investment, a notice of direct domestic investment 30 must be
filed with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of International Trade
and Industry,3I and the minister(s) in charge of the business con-
TARY ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE CONTROL
LAW, 1 (1980) [hereinafter COMMENTARY] It is the broadest amendment in the FECL's
thirty year history. Id., at 2.
24. Law No. 163 of 1950.
25. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 1.
26. Hasegawa, Shdken Shijd Kokusaika eno Taid: Tokuni Hakkdshjd no Seidoteki
Kdchokuka Dakaiwo (Facing the Internationalization of the Security Market: Especially the
Relaxation in Systematic Rigidity of Over-the-Counter Sales), 894 COM. L. REV. 41 (1981);
Crampe & Benes, Majority Ownership Strategies For Japan, 1 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 41, 43
(1982); Smith, The Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Adminis-
trative Guidance: The Labyrinth and the Castle, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417, 421 (1984).
However, the exceptions are forestry, fishery, mining, oil, and leather industries (wholesale and
retailing). Katakura Kdgyd no Shin-gaitame Hd ni Yoru Kokuji Shobun Torikeshi Seikyu Jiken
no Soji, 899 CoM. L. REV. 30, 32 (1981).
27. Hasegawa, supra note 26, at 41; Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 43; Reynolds,
Foreign Investment in Japan: The Legal and Social Climate, 18 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 175, 195
(1983). "This contrasts sharply with previous statutory schemes that forbade all capital trans-
actions unless permitted by administrative validation after a case-by-case [kobetsu shinsa] re-
view." Id.; Old FECL, supra note 22, arts. 1, 2 (stipulating that when the competent ministry,
upon case-by-case evaluation, believed the transaction would positively contribute to the Japa-
nese economy, it granted validation), cited in Smith, supra note 26, at 423; Reynolds, supra at
421 & n.ll.
28. See infra. text accompanying notes 65-67.
29. FECL, ch. 5. "Direct Domestic Investments, etc" chapter replaced former corre-
sponding provisions in the Foreign Investment Law. GAISHINI KANSURU H6RITSU (Foreign
Investment Law) Law No. 163 of 1950; COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 9.
30. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26.
31. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 29.
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cerned.32 The notice must disclose the purpose of the business, the
amount involved, and the time of execution.3 3 A foreign investor as
defined in chapter 5 is:
(1) a non-resident natural person; 34
(2) a juridical3 5 person or other organization established under
foreign law36 or one that has its principal office of business in a
foreign country;
37
(3) a company in which a foreign investor defined in (1) or (2)
above directly or indirectly possesses a number of shares equal
to or greater than 50% of that company's total issued shares;
38
(4) a company in which a foreign investor defined in (1) or (2)
above directly or indirectly possesses a number of shares equal
to or greater than 50% of the total capital contribution made
to that company;
39
(5) a juridical4° person or another organization in which a major-
ity of directors or officers having the power of representation
are non-resident natural persons; 41 or
(6) any person, not mentioned in (1)-(5) above, who transacts a
direct domestic investment on behalf of a foreign investor, but
does not do so in the latter's name.
42
As defined in chapter 5, the relevant form of direct domestic in-
vestments are:
32. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 3 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, 19 (Z. Kita-
gawa ed. 1986)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 43.
33. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 3 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-19
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
34. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 1 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 43.
35. Juridical means "relating to admission of justice, or office of a judge." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 765 (5th ed. 1979).
36. Branches of foreign juridical persons located in Japan are construed to be foreign
investors within the meaning of this subsection. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 30.
37. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 1(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 43-44.
38. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 1(3) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44 & n.8.
39. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 1(3) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C- 17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44 & n.8.
40. See supra note 35.
41. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 1(4) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44.
42. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 5 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-19
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)). But the provision specifically exempts from the category of direct
domestic investments, securities house stock transactions for portfolio purposes. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
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(1) with respect to the shares of an unlisted company,43 acquisi-
tion" or transfer45 of shares or contribution shares, and
(2) with respect to listed corporations, acquisition of aggregate to-
tal shares equal to or greater than 10% of total outstanding
shares when counted together with shares already held by a
juridical person.
46
When a resident buys shares, subsequently becomes a non-resi-
dent and then transfers his/her shares to a foreign investor, the chap-
ter does not apply.47 Further, there is no requirement of filing a
notice with the ministries where routine share purchases through des-
ignated securities firms are involved,48 or when the acquisition of a
listed company's shares amounts to less than 10% of the outstanding
shares.
4 9
2. The Waiting Period and Ministerial Inquiries
A foreign investor who has given notice of a pending acquisition
is not permitted to proceed with the transaction until thirty days after
the ministers receive the notice.50 This period may be shortened, and
most transactions are generally carried out before the thirty day pe-
riod has elapsed. Hence, it is theoretically possible for foreign pur-
chasers to initiate tender offers as quickly as their domestic
counterparts. Domestic counterparts in Japan are required to file a
notice only ten days prior to the intended starting date for tender of-
fers.5 2 In fact, during the first tender offer in Japan in 1972, a United
States investor, Bendix Corporation, was allowed to initiate the tender
offer on the tenth working day from the date it gave notice to the
43. Listed companies are defined in Japanese SEL, art. 2, para. 11.
44. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 2(1) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44.
45. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 2(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-
17-18 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
46. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 2(3) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-17
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44 & n.10.
47. FECL, ch. 5, art. 26, para. 2(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-
17-18 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
48. Henderson, supra note 6, at 140. Japanese SEL, No. 25, 1948 art. 2, 9 and Foreign
Securities Firm Act, art. 2, item 2, Law No. 5, 1971. But this is not really an exemption,
because the designated securities firms are required to report their transactions through the
Bank of Japan. K. TSUNEMATSU, S. YANESE, M. YASUDA & T. TAKUOKA, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION, Booklet 1, (1986) [hereinafter TSUNEMATSU & YANESE].
49. Id. at 18; Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 44 & n.10.
50. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 34.
51. Id.
52. Japanese SEL, art. 2.
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ministries of the intent to make a tender offer.53
Additionally, according to article 27, chapter 5 of the FECL, if
the ministers "deem it necessary to make an inquiry," the execution
of the direct domestic investment will be suspended for up to four
months from the receipt of the report. 54 Further, this suspension may
be extended an additional month, to a total of five months from the
receipt of the report, in order to allow the Committee on Foreign Ex-
change and other Transactions 55 to express an opinion.
56
Such extensions may lead to a recommendation by the ministers
to "alter the particulars" of the direct domestic investment.5 7 Fur-
ther, a directive to suspend the execution of the direct domestic in-
vestment may be given in certain circumstances as explained below. 58
Where the ministers recommend to "alter the particulars," the inves-
tors must decide whether or not to consent to the recommendation. 59
However, what constitutes an alteration of particulars is unclear.
Moreover, while this quasi-regulatory guidance by the ministries is
called "administrative guidance," 60 it is an unfortunate label because
the plain meaning of "guidance" implies an option to reject a recom-
mendation. Investors, however, have no choice but to accept admin-
istrative guidance.
According to article 27, once parties are notified of the recom-
mendation and they fail to give notice of their consent or lack of con-
53. Matsuzawa, Kabushiki no Kjkai Kaitsuke Daiichigd wo oete (Having Completed the
First Public Tender Offer), 595 CoM. L. REV. 17 (1971).
54. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1, (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
55. The Committee on Foreign Exchange and other Transactions was established in place
of Foreign Investment Council which was set up under the now-abrogated Foreign Investment
Law. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 51. The Committee was established for the purpose of
"investigating and studying important matters concerning direct domestic investments,
etc .. " Id. What "important matters" are to be studied is not entirely clear. Lack of case
law aggravates the difficulty of construing the extent of the Committee's authority or power.
However, the fact that the Committee is an auxiliary organ of the Ministry of Finance may
signify that it is not entirely independent of the Ministry. Hence, the Committee is subject to
the Ministry's opinion. Further, the Committee members are scholars appointed by the Minis-
ter of Finance. FECL, ch. 6-2, art. 55-3, para. 2.
56. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 2-3 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-21
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
57. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 2 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-21
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
58. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 34.
59. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 4 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-21
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
60. For an inside account of administrative guidance, see generally Smith, supra note 26.
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sent to alterations, the ministers may order an alteration of the
particulars of the investment or a suspension of the execution. 61 Due
to the lack of case law, it is unknown exactly how broad the ministers
are willing to interpret the meaning of "alter the particulars." How-
ever, if the ministers have the power to order a suspension of the exe-
cution of tender offers, their power to vary the terms of the offers is
inclusive. Also, the repercussions of rejecting the recommendation
may be serious because the ministries may not take kindly to such a
defiant stance from the foreign sector.
Two circumstances warranting ministerial inquiries are of inter-
est here. 62 The relevant provisions to which the ministerial inquiries
apply are as follows:
(1) When [the acquisition] might imperil the national security, hin-
der the maintenance of public order, or hinder the protection of
the safety of the general public;
63
(2) [the acquisition] might have a serious bad effect on the activi-
ties of business enterprises in Japan engaging in a line of busi-
ness similar (including business related) to the one in which the
direct domestic investment, etc., is to be made or the smooth
operation of Japan's economy;64
61. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 7 (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-22
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)). Cf Matsushita, supra note 13, at 376, which gives an official defini-
tion of administrative guidance. See generally, Smith, supra note 26.
62. Other instances requiring notice to the ministries, but not relevant for discussion
here are: where the ministers deem the use of the fund to require alteration of the particulars,
such as requiring investors to obtain a permit or cessation of execution all together. The minis-
ters may find that the necessity arose where the transaction (a) might make the maintenance of
the equilibrium of Japan's balance of international payments difficult; (b) might result in a
sudden and severe fluctuation in [the value of the Japanese yen]; or (c) might result in transfers
of large amounts of funds between Japan and foreign countries and thereby have a bad effect
on [Japanese yen] or capital market. FECL, ch. 4, art. 21, para. 2 (translated in DOING BusI-
NESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-10 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)).
63. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(1), (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-
20 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)) (emphasis added); see also Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
64. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)) (emphasis added); Crampe & Benes, supra note 25, at 46. Additional
prerequisites to the recommendation or directive are:
3) Where, because it is made by a foreign investor with whose country no treaties or
other international agreements have been concluded by Japan with regard to the
direct domestic investments, etc., its particulars must be altered, or its execution
must be stopped, in order to make conditions substantially equal to those allowed
to Japanese nationals' direct investment activities (which mean those equivalent
to direct domestic investment, etc., mentioned in any item of paragraph 2 of the
proceeding article) in that country; or
4) When, in light of its purpose regarding the use of funds, etc., it falls under, in
whole or in part, capital transactions upon which an obligation to obtain a permit
1989]
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For reference purposes, the first clause above will be called the na-
tional security clause, while the second will be called the economic
protection clause.
The national security clause presupposes protection for industries
in which liberalization is not required by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") 65 Code of liberali-
zation of capital movements such as "weapon, explosives, nuclear
power, and special vaccine" industries. 66 The economic protection
clause was designed to protect industries such as "agriculture and
fishery, mining, oil, leather and leather products manufacturing" 67 as
they were still not liberalized at the time of 1979 amendment of the
FECL. The second provision is especially important because a Cabi-
net Order referring to this clause allows the government to designate
industries which the government deems should be free of takeover
threats.68 The case of Newpis v. Katakura69 illustrates an instance in
which the government exercised the power of designation.
B. Analysis of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law
The FECL sets forth its statutory purpose as follows:
The purpose of this Act shall be, on the basis of freedom of...
foreign transactions, and by exercising necessary but minimum
controls or adjustments, to enable proper expansion of our foreign
transactions, and thereby to facilitate the equilibrium of our bal-
ance of international payments and the stability of our currency, as
well as to contribute towards the sound development of our na-
tional economy.
70
Despite this preamble, evidence of protectionism is rampant in the
is imposed pursuant to the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 2, and therefore its
particulars must be altered, or its execution must be stopped.
FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(2)-(4) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20.
65. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
66. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 36; Direct Investment Ordinance Article 5, para.
2(l)-(2), and Notification (kokuji) No. 1 of June 20, 1985, cited in International Securities
Regulation, supra note 48, at 102-103.
67. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 36.
68. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 2, (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
69. For a discussion ofNewpis v. Katakura, Case No. 20 of 1981, Tokyo District Court,
2nd Civil Affair Division, see infra text accompanying notes 87-102.
70. GAIKOKU KAWASE OYOBI GAIKOKU B6EKI KANRI-HO (Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law), Law No. 65, 1979, ch. 1, art. 1 (translated in DOING BUSINESS
IN JAPAN, app. 3c-16 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)) (emphasis added).
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FECL. First, in the direct domestic investment provisions of the
FECL, there is evidence of an intent to discourage foreign takeovers
in Japan.7' Second, the vague language of the provision facilitates and
promotes a manipulative application. For example, the Ministry of
Finance conceded that certain regulatory measures are to be imposed
under the provisions of the FECL where any external transaction
"causes a friction at home or abroad." 72 The probable nature of fric-
tion that is likely to arise in Japan and outside of Japan are different
from each other. However, what kind of situations warrant the regu-
latory measures to be triggered? Likewise, what constitutes "causing
friction?" It seems that the Japanese government has discretion when
determining what situations are deemed to be causing friction. The
restriction under the article that such measures should be limited to
"necessary but minimum control or adjustment" is an illusory restric-
tion when the Japanese government has so much discretion.
The new FECL has not changed the substantive restriction
which pervaded the original FECL. The recommendation issued by
the advisory Committee on Legal System of Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade73 sheds some light on the process by which the new
FECL retained the old restrictive nature. The Advisory Committee
report was adopted as the basis of the amendment and reads as
follows:
(1) External transactions should be liberalized as far as possible,
and the restrictions imposed thereupon should be limited to
those of absolute necessity.
(2) Nonetheless, under the current international economic situa-
tion of rapid changes, in order to allow our national economy
to cope with such changes timely and properly, a mechanism
should be retained which can exert a quick and effective con-
trol in such events as turbulent foreign exchange rate fluctua-
tions and other anomalies.
(3) Current transactions are to be liberalized almost fully, except
in such sensitive areas as resources, energy, etc. Administra-
tive formalities concerning foreign trade, such as export certifi-
cation, etc., should be extensively simplified, and at the same
time the current control over the methods of payments should
also be rearranged towards liberalization.
(4) The basic system of freedom in principle with restriction only
71. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 38.
72. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 9.
73. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 6.
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in cases of emergency should also be applied to capital transac-
tions. The imposable restrictions might include not only quan-
titative ones to cope with the speculative movement of funds in
large sum[s] and for the maintenance of equilibrium of the bal-
ance of international payments, but also qualitative ones to
cope with the extraordinary and abnormal dealings which ad-
versely affect domestic and foreign money markets.
(5) With a view to ensuring effective activation of emergency regu-
lations as given in (2) above, as well as gathering constant in-
formation of external transactions, the current system of
authorized foreign exchange banks should be retained.
(6) Intake of foreign capital and foreign technology should also be
liberalized in principal, but a mechanism should be retained in
order to cope with exceptional cases which might adversely af-
fect our national economy.
74
Despite the claim that "external transactions should be liberal-
ized as far as possible," each recommendation of liberalization is al-
ways coupled with some exceptional cases warranting a restriction.
According to the recommendation to the Advisory Committee, the
principle of freedom should be conditioned upon a restriction. The
ambivalence toward a total liberalization conveyed in the Advisory
Committee report was transferred straight into the amendment. The
report, as well as the amendment, takes away with its left hand what
it gives with its right. The direct domestic investment provisions war-
ranting ministerial inquiries are illustrative.
At the time of the 1979 amendment to the FECL, the ministries
clearly contemplated that the regulation would serve as a preventive
measure against foreign takeovers. This position was explicated in an
official commentary published by the legal division of the Ministry of
Finance. 75 By a cabinet order,76 the Japanese government retained
the power to regulate stockholding of 25% or more held by "non-
resident natural persons" 77 in certain designated companies. When
such an acquisition is intended, the potential purchaser must give
prior notice and may not acquire the stock for thirty days.
The subsequent procedures after the thirty day period are similar
to those of direct domestic investments. For example, the ministries
74. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 5-6.
75. Id.
76. FECL, Cabinet Order of 1980; COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 39.
77. "Non-resident natural person" includes non-resident natural persons, juridical per-
sons or organizations established under foreign legislation, and/or juridical persons or organi-
zations having main offices in a foreign country. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 39.
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may extend the waiting period to a maximum of four months if the
Ministries perceive a potential threat to national security, economy,
or to any industry.
78
The direct domestic investment provisions governing investments
which involve complex shareholding patterns appear to indicate that
the Japanese government intends to exert a maximum control over
foreign investments. Before certain types of transactions are carried
out, the Japanese government must be notified of the investor's inten-
tions and allowed to investigate the impact of the proposed invest-
ment. For example, in a transaction between two juridical persons
who occupy a "special relationship" 79 results in a holding of 10% or
more of the total outstanding stock of the listed corporation, the
transaction must be reported to the Japanese government. As an il-
lustration, let us designate the purchaser as A, the juridical person or
organization holding shares or interest in the listed company in ques-
tion as B, the second juridical person or organization as C, and the
third juridical person or organization a D. For a special relationship
to exist, the relationship between the purchaser, A, and the target, B,
must be such that:
(a) the purchaser, A, owns 50% or more stock or interest in the
juridical person, B;
(b) B owns 50% or more stock or interest in A;
(c) A owns 50% or more interest in C which, in turn, owns 50%
or more interest in B;
(d) reciprocally, B owns 50% or more interest in C which, in turn
owns 50% or more interest in A;
(e) C owns 50% or more interest in A and B;
(f) C wholly owns B, and 50% or more of D which owns 50% or
more of A;
(g) D owns 50% or more interest in A and C, and C wholly owns
B; or
(h) A and B are foreign government agencies.
80
The foreign investment regulation according to shareholding pattern
is quite extensive and thorough. The scheme of the regulation shows
that the Japanese government has a deep-rooted desire to keep a close
78. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 40.
79. The "special relationship" is defined extensively in a Direct Investment Cabinet Or-
der. Tainai Chokusetsu Tdshinado ni Kansuru Seirei (Cabinet Order Concerning Direct Do-
mestic Investment) (translation by Crampe & Benes) art. 2(4)-(5), cited in Crampe & Benes,
supra note 26, at 44 nn.8 & 10.
80. Id.
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check on foreign holding of interests in existing Japanese
corporations."1
1. Ministerial Inquiries
An example of a ministerial inquiry can be seen in a recent case
involving a United States-United Kingdom joint venture, Trafalger-
Glen Investment Inc., and a Japanese precision ball bearing manufac-
turer, Minebea. 82 The joint venture attempted a hostile takeover of
Minebea after acquiring a considerable quantity of convertible bonds
overseas. Trafalger-Glen was uncertain if Minebea and the Ministries
would block the tender offer on the ground that Minebea's articles of
incorporation contain a clause enumerating the capacity to engage in
"manufacturing and sales of aircraft or flying objects." The national
security clause8 3 allows a ministerial inquiry to interrupt the tender
offer when the Ministries deem the transaction poses a danger to na-
tional security.8 4 This was a major concern for the purchaser who
later initiated a rescission suit against Minebea who started negotiat-
ing an acquisition of Sanky6 Corporation, a Japanese music box
manufacturer.8 5
Due to the absence of case law defining the scope of the national
81. For example, outside the direct domestic investment area, the FECL exempts routine
share purchases through designated securities firms from notification requirements but actual
notice is done by the securities firms. TSUNEMATSU & YANESE, supra note 48, at 12. See
generally, Henderson, supra note 6.
82. Ames, Buying a piece of Japan, Inc.: Foreign Acquisitions in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 541, 553-54 (1986); Crabb, supra note 7, at 106.
83. See supra text accompanying note 63.
84. FECL, ch. 5.
85. Ames, supra note 79, at 553-54. Minebea had been acquiring Sanky6 shares but had
not disclosed its intention to acquire to the Sanky6 management.
In February, 1986, upon learning of Minebea's plan to takeover Sanky6, Trafalger-Glen
brought a suit in Ueda Shibu, Nagano Chihd Saibansho (district court) seeking to block the
merger of Minebea and Sanky6 and the issuance of new stocks. M. MIYAZAKI, M&A NO
KENKYO (MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONs RESEARCH), 82 (1986). Chihd Saibansho is a court
of first instance for civil and criminal cases and hears appeals from Summary Court (Kdtd
Saibansho, or KdsaO. Trafalger-Glen claimed that Minebea's intention to acquire Sanky6 was
not in the best interest of the shareholders such as Trafalger-Glen, and therefore the merger
between Minebea and Sanky6 should be annulled. Id.
However, it is doubtful that the annulment of the merger between the two Japanese cor-
porations was Trafalger- Glen's true motive in bringing the suit. First, Trafalger-Glen brought
the suit knowing that their chances of winning were slim. Id. at 86. The Saikd Saibansho
(Supreme Court) had previously held that invidious intentions or motives have no effect on the
validity of decisions in a shareholder meeting. Nagano Chih6sai Ueda Shibu Minebea gawa no
Tanpo Teikyd Seikyzi Mitomeru Kettei gaku wa Gdkei A, 15 million (Ueda Shibu, Nayano Dis-
trict Court Endorses Minebea's demand for Bond; The Amount is Y15 Million), 1075 COM. L.
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security clause in the FECL, Trafalger-Glen had no recourse but to
proceed blindly with the acquisition while fearing that the ministries
might invoke the clause against them. In the worst case, Trafalger-
Glen would have had to wait for five months before it could proceed
with the tender offer. This is an extremely long waiting period be-
cause five months allow ample time for the target company to prepare
its defense to the unwanted acquisition attempt.
The FECL clauses which allow ministerial inquiries permit the
ministries to tailor the direct domestic investment pattern as desired.
The articles of the FECL are worded in vague terms so that potential
investors, as well as legal scholars, a6 have trouble finding meaningful
guidelines as to when a provision of the FECL is triggered. Two key
factors keep the whims of the ministers in check: international criti-
cism of Japanese "protectionism" and the mounting pressure caused
REV. 733, 734 (1986) (SaikiSaibansho is a regional court of appeal for appeals from District,
Family and Summary Courts.)
Trafalger-Glen also waited for four months before they decided to bring suit. Id. In
October, 1985, Minebea announced the plan to acquire Sanky6 and their acquisition was to
take place in April, 1986. Id. Trafalger-Glen claimed that they owned Minebea shares at the
time of announcement, and was qualified to bring the suit. Id. The court held that because of
the unexplained delay in filing the suit and the fact that their claim was legally unfounded, the
plaintiffs had other motives in mind: namely, the suit was to serve as a threat to the defendant,
Minebea. Id. Further, the court found that Trafalger-Glen was hoping for the shares to go up
in value so that they could sell them at a higher price. Id. Trafalger-Glen filed the suit know-
ing that the suit would cause various damages to Minebea. The court ordered them to pay the
bond required of foreign plaintiffs in the amount of fifteen million yen to be paid in ten days.
Id. at 735.
The press also reported that the takeover was an attempt at "crass greenmail," and
Trafalger-Glen was just testing the waters in the Japanese market. M. MIYAZAKI, supra, at 65.
The speculation has been that Trafalger-Glen was feeling out the possibility of tender offers in
Japan. Id. One of the notable characteristics of this takeover attempt was that Minebea is the
merger and acquisition growth firm of Japan. Minebea grew ten times in ten years at the
annual growth rate of 25% by merging and acquiring related and unrelated companies. T.
ABE, JISSEN KIGY6 BAISH0 (CORPORATE ACQUISITION PRACTICE), 39. By 1971, Minebea
already had a marketing base in the United States. Muramatsu, Beikoku ni Okeru Wagakuni
Kigyd no Gappei, Baishu Kddd no Shintenkai (New Development in Merger/Acquisition activi-
ties of Japanese corporations in the United States), KINYU J. 14 (Oct. 1985). But in September
of 1971, Minebea bought a ball bearing manufacturing factory owned by a Swedish corpora-
tion that has the biggest ball bearing market share in the world. Id. Minebea paid cash for the
factory. Id. Trafalger-Glen was in fact sparring with a corporation quite experienced in merg-
ers and acquisitions both in Japan and in the United States. Starting in 1971, when it bought
an United States ball bearing manufacturer, SKF Reed Factory, Minebea has taken over
twenty-two companies. T. ABE, supra, at 41, table 4.
86. For example, see Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 50. Misawa, supra note 1, at 793
(expressed fear that "all foreign investments which would be construed as being unfavorable to
the Japanese side would be eliminated in the screening process.")
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by the huge trade surpluses Japan has against the United States and
other nations.
2. The Newpis case: abuse of government power
In Newpis v. Katakura,8 7 the controversy arose between
Katakura Industries, Ltd., and a group of Hong Kong investors who
were heavily involved in real estate and leasing operations."8
Katakura was one of the firms to be designated by the government as
requiring an inquiry before the enforcement of the FECL.8 9 At that
time, the Hong Kong group in Katakura held about 23.5% of issued
stock.90 The government had prescribed 25% as the level of foreign
holdings that would trigger an inquiry. The 25% designation was crit-
icized not only by Wang and his associates-the Hong Kong investors
involved in the case-but also by the Japanese public.91 While all the
other designated companies are involved in industries that arguably
should or can be protected-oil, nuclear power, aircraft instruments,
narcotics and vaccines, and agriculture-fisheries-Katakura is a tex-
tiles company.9
2
After the designation, the government attempted to legitimatize
the action by arguing that Katakura's business activities fell into the
protected category of "agriculture" because it held a 10% share of the
raw silk processing market and a 13% share in the "traditional" silk-
worm market. 93 This argument, unfortunately, was undermined by
the fact that only about 2% of Katakura's sales were comprised of the
traditional silkworm business and 46% of the raw silk process
market.
94
In 1981, Newpis announced that they were filing with the Minis-
ter of Finance a plan to purchase nearly 10% of Katakura's shares on
the open market.95 Fearing the takeover by the Hong Kong group,
Katakura's top management pressured the government.96 Katakura's
87. Case No. 20 of 1981, Tokyo District Court, 2nd Civil Affair Division.





93. Nikkei Shinbun, Feb. 24, 1981, at 3, cited in Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 54,
n.66.
94. Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 54-55.
95. Id. at 56.
96. Id. at 55.
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designation was a product of considerable lobbying. 97 And, the gov-
ernment refused to accept Newpis' notification on a technical ground.
Newpis subsequently instigated the suit against the Ministers of
Finance, International Trade and Industry, Welfare, and Agriculture,
attacking the government's designation of Katakura and seeking its
annulment. 98 The government was reported to be more cautious after
the Newpis case. However, the FECL's susceptability to government
manipulation was apparent. 99
Prior amendments and changes in the FECL have indeed liberal-
ized the market in a gradual manner. The most recent amendment in
the five stage liberalization program, the 1979 amendment to the
FECL, changed the general statutory philosophy: foreign investments
are "permitted unless specifically prohibited." 100 Formally, foreign
investments were "prohibited unless allowed specifically." °101 And,
there is no doubt that the Japanese government would rather keep the
market closed as much as possible. Although the Japanese govern-
ment has always publicized that extensive liberalization is being un-
dertaken and has exhibited sensitivity to external criticism, it has
managed to keep the extent of liberalization to a minimum. 102
3. The Future Direction of the FECL
What are some of the possible solutions to limit arbitrary govern-
ment actions? One possible way to restrict expansive reading of the
statute by the government is to repeal all the provisions warranting
ministerial inquiries. However, a complete repeal of the restriction
may be too drastic and dangerous to national security and economic
stability of Japan. For example, if the national security clause 103 is
97. Id.
98. Case No. 20 of 1981, Tokyo District Court, 2nd Civil Affairs Division.
99. Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 58.
100. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 2-3.
101. Id.
102. Henderson, supra note 6, at 136.
The 1980 Amendment to the FECL was the first major statutory revision since its
enactment in 1949. Through the years, administrative practices under the statute
changed gradually to approve routine transactions. These administrative changes are
what has been called liberalization in the press during the past twenty years. Basi-
cally, the restrictive statutory framework remained: all transactions with foreign in-
vestors and nonresidents are prohibited, until approved by the government.
Henderson also notes that the gap between these announcements and the actual official prac-
tices has damaged the credibility of the Japanese bureaucrats. Id.
103. When the acquisition might "imperil the national security, hinder the maintenance of
public order, or hinder the protection or the safety of the general public." FECL, ch. 5, art.
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repealed, a serious repercussion is clearly foreseen. One example of
the type of incident that might occur happened to Toshiba. In the
Toshiba incident, the sale of the military sensitive products was con-
summated in the United States and the final destination was the So-
viet Union. The fact that the United States is Japan's ally does not
prevent the risk of repeating a Toshiba incident since an incident simi-
lar to Toshiba selling military sensitive products to the Soviets may
result from abolishing the national security clause.
Further, a blanket repeal of the national security clause does not
preclude manipulation by lobbyists. The following United States ex-
ample demonstrates how easily national security can be manipulated
to block potential foreign takeovers. In 1971, Minebea acquired a
New Hampshire ball bearing company. °4 Having decided to make
an inroad into the United States market, Minebea set out to establish
a United States subsidiary. 10 5 However, the Pentagon shut out for-
eign competitors in ball bearing manufacturing on the pretext that the
national defense would be adversely affected. '0 6 As did the Japanese
company in the Newpis case, United States ball bearing companies,
under fierce competition from Japanese ball bearing manufacturers,
lobbied the Pentagon to keep the Japanese out of the domestic mar-
ket. 10 7 Their rationale was that foreign-made ball bearings would im-
peril the United States national security.1
0 8
This provides insight into two propositions. First, lobbying is an
extremely effective way to manipulate the government. Both the Jap-
27, para. 1(1) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987));
Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
104. The target was SKF Reed Factory. Since then, Minebea has taken over twenty-two
companies. T. ABE, supra note 83, at 41, Table 4.
105. T. ABE, supra note 83, at 40.
106. Another instance of the United States government invoking the national defense ar-
gument to prevent a foreign acquisition is Fujitsu's attempt to acquire Fairchild. M. Gitin &
R. Barker, Structuring Transactional Acquisitions, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1987, at 21, col. 4 and
at 27, col. 1, n.4. In that case, Fujitsu, Ltd., a Japanese conglomerate involved in manufactur-
ing computer chips, attempted to acquire 80% interest in Fairchild Corporation, a United
States computer chip maker. Id. at 21, col. 3-4. The Pentagon vigorously opposed the Fujitsu
plan, and Fujitsu abandoned the idea of pursuing negotiations. Id. However, when the hoopla
died down, Fujitsu negotiated a technology tie-up with Fairchild. Id. at 27, n.4. This time,
Congress and the Pentagon did very little in the way of opposing the technological exchange.
Id. The United States government, by failing to follow up on the case, undermined their initial
position in opposing the acquisition. In that sense, the United States government is as guilty of
manipulating its antimonopoly law as the Japanese government of protecting certain indus-
tries. Id.
107. T. ABE, supra note 85, at 40.
108. T. ABE, supra note 85, at 41 (1986).
596 [Vol. 11:579
Tender Offers in Japan
anese government and the United States government owe a duty to
construe their respective national safety provisions objectively so as
not to abuse their respective powers. More importantly, however, in
the United States example the Pentagon expended considerable en-
ergy looking into the matter. Yet, in the end, they declined to pro-
mulgate a blanket prohibition over foreign takeovers in ball bearing
manufacturing. In contrast, the Japanese government, in the context
of the economic protection clause, designated Katakura off-limits.
While the Pentagon had a plausible argument that the Minebea's
takeover posed a threat to national security, it declined to prohibit the
takeover. The Japanese government exhibited its willingness to
stretch the letter of the law to protect its national industries.
It is unwise to abrogate the entire provision in an extremely sen-
sitive area such as national security. On the other hand, repealing a
provision restricting a competitive foreign investment in a purely eco-
nomic sense is less problematic. The economic protection clause pro-
vides that when an acquisition may "detrimentally affect the activities
of business enterprises in a line of business similar or related to the
one in which the direct domestic investment is to be made, or when
the acquisition may adversely affect on the smooth operation of Ja-
pan's economy."' 1 9
The economic protection clause bars from Japan foreign invest-
ments which adversely affect the Japanese economy. The clause
designates "petroleum, agriculture and fishery, mining, leather and
leather product manufacturing"' 110 as areas requiring ministerial in-
quiry. However, clean-slate liberalization of these industries is proba-
bly not forthcoming. Petroleum is an important resource to Japan, a
country of scarce resources. The control over resources such as petro-
leum is in effect political control. Such a sensitive area is not likely to
be liberalized unless substantial pressure is applied from outside.
The agriculture, fishery, mining and leather industries are also
unlikely to be liberalized in the near future. The Japanese govern-
ment considers these as declining industries.III Rather than revital-
izing the industries with an infusion of foreign capital, the
government has chosen to keep them closed to foreign investment.
Furthermore, these protected industries are a major part of the con-
109. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
110. COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 36.
111. Smith, supra note 26, at 467.
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stituency base of leading politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party.112 There is no reason why politicians should jeopardize their
political base by subjecting their constituents to competition from
abroad. Hence, these industries will remain closed to foreign
investment.
An alternative to a total repeal of the national security clause and
the economic protection clause is to redraft them narrowly. In their
present state, the clauses are vague and overbroad. For instance, the
national security clause grants protection if the acquisition might im-
peril the national security, hinder the maintenance of public order, or
hinder the protection of the general public's safety. 11 3 It is conceiva-
ble that these three matters are one and the same and in the tradition
of legal draftsmanship are simply reiterated. However, what consti-
tutes endagering the national security or hindering maintainance of
public order and safety remains largely undefined.
In the economic protection clause,"14 protection is granted where
the acquisition might have a "serious bad effect" on the activities of
business enterprises; but what is a "serious bad effect?" It is unknown
how serious a "bad effect" has to be. What constitutes an interference
with the "smooth operation of Japan's economy"' 15 is also ambigious.
There is very little guidance in applying the national security clause
and economic protection clause, and a lack of judicial precedent inter-
preting the clauses aggravates the situation. However, the outrageous
application of the economic protection clause in the Newpis case forces
one to apply the clause conservatively.
The drafters may be better able to guide potential investors if the
legislative purpose is made clear by listing the typical situations in
which the ministry will apply the economic protection clause and the
national security clause. Yet, Advisory report does not provide a typi-
cal situation which triggers protection of the FECL."I6
C. The Japanese Securities and Exchange Law
It was not until 1971 that the Japanese Securities and Exchange
Law ("Japanese SEL") was amended to provide a mechanism for a
112. Id.
113. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(1) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
114. FECL, ch. 5, art. 27, para. 1(2) (translated in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 3C-20
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1987)); Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 46.
115. Id.
116. See, COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 6-7.
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tender offer called an "open stock acquisition system."'1 7 A concern
which triggered the amendment was that foreign enterprises would
take over businesses in Japan in the wake of capital liberation. 11 This
section discusses the background and the law of the Japanese SEL
followed by the comparative study of the Bendix case which involves
a foreign purchaser and the Okinawa Power case which involves a
Japanese purchaser.
It must be conceded, that the current Japanese SEL does not
treat foreign interests and Japanese investors differently. The lan-
guage of the Japanese SEL does not differentiate between a foreign
investor and a Japanese investor, nor does it have a facially neutral
requirement which discriminates against a foreign investor. The case
law below demonstrates that application of the Japanese SEL was uni-
form in a case involving a takeover by a foreign investor, Bendix, 11 9
and another involving a takeover by a Japanese company, Okinawa
Electric Power C0.120 .
Before 1971, the Japanese Commercial Code categorized corpo-
rate consolidations into three classes: 121 (1) mergers, 22 (2) consolida-
tions,123 and (3) transfers of business or business assets. 124 As no
tender offers were made before 1971, the Japanese Commercial Code
did not specifically deal with tender offers. 125 Instead, the Japanese
were heavily engaged in mergers 26 most of which took place among
affiliated companies.
127
117. Kdkai Kaitsuke in Japanese. See Misawa, supra note 1, at 790.
118. Loss, YAZAWA & BANOFF, JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, 174 (1983); see
also, Misawa, supra note 1, at 790.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
121. TSUNEMATSU & YANESE, supra note 48, at 69.
122. A merger takes place when the surviving corporation takes over all of the assets and
liabilities of the dissolving corporations. Id. Shareholders of the dissolved corporation become
shareholders of the surviving corporation. Id.
123. Where a new corporation emerges as a result of the dissolution of two or more corpo-
rations, a consolidation occurs. Id. The liabilities and assets of the dissolved corporations
become the responsibilities of the newly-emerged corporation. Id.
124. All of the business and business assets of a corporation may be transferred to another
corporation irrespective of status of the first transferring corporation after the transfer. Id.
125. Loss, supra note 118, at 172 & n.55.
126. S. Muramatsu, The Effect of Corporate Mergers 1 (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
127. Approximately 70% of the post-war period mergers were of this type. Id. But, note
that this type of merger is not considered a merger as in the United States, and hence is
excluded from statistics. Id. To illustrate the magnitude of this type of merger in Japan, dis-
solved corporations' assets were valued at Y9.3 billion per merger in the period from 1980 to
1983. Id. See also, Misawa, supra note 1, at 791, 804, table 3 (pointing out that mergers often
take place among "firms belonging to the same group," called keiretsu companies).
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The current Japanese SEL defines a tender offer as an exchange
or sale of share certificates (or other securities) either by a public offer
to buy or a public solicitation to sell.1 28 Tender offers may be classi-
fied as friendly,1 29 hostile, 130 or neutral. 3 1 A friendly tender offer oc-
curs when the target corporation agrees to the acquisition plan and is
cooperative toward the plan.13 2 For example, the 1972 case of Bendix
acquiring a Japanese corporation, Jidosha Kiki, Co. (Jidosha Kiki),
where the two corporations agreed to the tender offer of Jidosha
Kiki's shares is a typical friendly tender offer.'
33
If, on the other hand, the target corporation either rejects the
purchaser's proposal of acquisition or is not informed about the plan
at all, the tender offer is hostile.134 An example of a hostile takeover is
the attempt by Minebea, a Japanese ball bearing manufacturer, to ac-
quire Sanky6 Co., a Japanese music box manufacturer. 135 Before
Sanky6 had notice of the acquisition attempt, Minebea had acquired
approximately three million shares of Sanky6 stocks and about six
million Sanky6 convertible bonds 136 issued overseas. The third type
of tender offer is a neutral tender offer and the target company is
neither cooperative nor hostile toward the acquisition attempt.
3 7
The Japanese SEL requires the filing of a tender offer registration
statement with the Minister of Finance before every tender offer.
138
The Japanese SEL includes an advance notice system which requires
that the statement be filed ten days before the tender offer can be
made.'3 9 Before the tender offer takes effect, ten days from the filing,
the offeror must deliver a copy of the tender offer registration state-
128. Japanese SEL, art. 27-2, para. 1. Cf. Loss, supra note 118 at 175. Tender offers
include cash tender offers, exchange tender offers, and cash tender offer and convertible pre-
ferred stock mergers depending on the form of payments. CORPORATE MERGERS AND AC-
QUISITIONS, supra note 4, at 56. The Japanese SEL treats cash and exchange offers for
outstanding securities in the same way. Loss, supra note 118, at 175.
129. INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 175.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. For definition of friendly tender offers, see also Misawa, supra note 1, at 790.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60.
134. INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 175. For definition
of hostile tender offers, see Misawa, supra note 1, at 790.
135. M. MIYAZAKI, supra note 85, at 71-72.
136. M. MIYAZAKI, supra note 85, at 72. Convertible bonds may be converted to shares
upon satisfaction of certain conditions. Id.
137. INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQuISITIONS, supra note 12, at 175.
138. Japanese SEL, art. 27, § 2.
139. The advance notice system makes controlling the flow of information difficult. But,
see Loss, supra note 118, which opines that the effect of the advance notice system is pro-
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ment (and the amendments, if any) to the issuer of the securities.t40
When the ten-day period is over, the offeror must give public notice of
the tender offer in two daily newspapers of general circulation report-
ing general affairs.' 4' The content of this report must include the fol-
lowing matters:
(1) period of purchase;
(2) purchase price;
(3) cancellation of contract;
(4) delivery of share certificates, etc. and other settlements relating
to the purchase;
(5) necessary matters relating to the purchase other than those
mentioned in the preceding items.
142
The minister may order the filing of an amendment if, after a
hearing, he/she finds that the form of the registration statement is
defective or that material items have not been sufficiently disclosed. 
43
The minister may also issue a stop order if he/she finds that the regis-
tration statement violates the law or is materially misleading. 44 In
addition, the minister has the power to inspect the files and docu-
ments of the tender offeror or its affiliates and to order the tender
offeror to make reports or submit materials. 4  Finally, the minister
may order the target company to submit a report or additional
materials. 1
46
Only in recent years have the Japanese started to recognize merg-
ers and acquisitions as viable business tactics in Japan. 47 This fact
stands in sharp contrast to the United States' business community
incumbent management. (In the United States, the notice to the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion within ten days after the 10% acquisition of shares). M. MIYAZAKI, supra note 85, at 77.
140. Japanese SEL, art. 27-3, para. 1.
141. Japanese SEL, art. 27-3, para. 2; Tender Offer Ordinance, arts. 6, 7.
142. Japanese SEL, art. 27-4, para. 3.
143. Id. art. 27-2, para. 2; art. 9. The registration statement will then become effective ten
days after compliance with the Minister's order. Id. art. 27-2, para. 2; art. 8, para. 1
144. Id. art. 27-2, para. 2; art. 10. The Minister may also issue a stop order if the registra-
tion statement is filed by a person who was subjected to an amendment order or stop order
under article 10 for any registration statement filed within the preceeding year. Id. art. 27-
2,para. 2; art. 11.
145. Id. art. 26, para. 1; art. 27-8, para. 1.
146. Id. art. 27-8, para. 2.
147. This is despite a large Japanese investment in the United States which is often done
through acquisitions. "Japanese firms last year announced 94 United States acquisitions worth
a total of $5.9 billion, up from $2.7 billion in 1986." Peterson, Weak Dollar, Deficits Put US.
on Sale, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 3. The article noted that the figures are
conservative ones due to the fact that many deals are consummated unannounced.
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which is currently experiencing a surge in merger activities 48 after
the three major merger and acquisition eras 49 between World War II
and the present. In Japan, a traditional corporate consolidation takes
place when one company acquires another in order to rescue the
weakened company from financial collapse, or merges with a sister or
subsidiary company. Hence, tender offers are rare in Japan--only
three cases have been reported. 50
Bendix, a United States corporation, was the first to complete a
takeover in the Japanese market. Bendix is a United States automo-
bile parts manufacturer with a Japanese subsidiary, Bendix Interna-
tional Finance Corporation.' 5 ' Bendix owned 13% of Jidosha Kiki
Co., an automobile parts manufacturer located in Japan with whom
Bendix does business. 5 2 In 1971, Bendix sought to increase the eq-
uity share ratio to 20%.153
Bendix initially attempted to acquire floating shares from the
market.154 However, the attempt netted Bendix a modest 2.1% in-
crease to 15.1%. Hence, in 1972, Bendix managed to obtain Jidosha
Kiki's agreement to cooperate in Bendix's takeover so that Bendix
could achieve a 20% equity share in Jidosha Kiki.
First, the Ministry of Finance gave their approval of the takeover
because the sole purpose of the tender offer was to acquire an owner-
ship interest of 20% as opposed to total control. 55 Since the object
was not to "takeover" in the sense that Jidosha Kiki's management
148. The deregulation policy of the Reagan Administration triggered a merger mania
starting in 1981. CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 4, at 27-41.
149. The first merger and acquisition era was between 1893 and 1904. Id. at 14-17. The
second one was between 1925 and 1930, and the last merger and acquisition which produced
numerous conglomerates in the United States took place between late 1960's and the early
1970's. Id. at 17-21.
150. ONOZAKI, KIGY6 BAISHO BAIKYAKU SENRYAKU (CORPORATE PURCHASE AND
SALE STRATEGY), 168-72 (1987).
151. Kigyd Baishti Q & A (Merger & Acquisition Questions and Answers), (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Mergers & Acquisitions Questions and Answers]; Onozaki, Introduction of M&A Activities in
Japan, OBIRIN ECON., 125, 135 (July 1987); Matsuzawa, "TOB Daiichigd" no Tanjd no Haikei
to Igi (The Meaning and the Background of the Birth of the First TOB), 590 COM. L. REv. 336;
Matsuzawa, Kabushiki no Kdkai Kaitsuke Daiichigd wo Oete (Having Completed the First Pub-
lic Tender Offer), 595 COM. L. REV. 551; Crampes and Benes, supra note 26, at 77, n.176
(1982).
152. ONOZAKI, supra note 150, at 170.
153. Id.
154. Bendix obtained permission to do so by filing with the Ministry of Finance persuant
to the FECL.
155. ONOZAKI, supra note 150, at 136.
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would have to compromise its control of the company, 156 the Ministry
of Finance saw no threat in approving the takeover.
Second, without the cooperation of the target Jidosha Kiki, Ben-
dix would not have had access to Jidosha Kiki shareholder list.'"5
The shareholder list enabled the tender offer representative, Yamaichi
Securities Co., Ltd.,'15 to solicit responses from 392 shareholders by
extending offers to 1889 shareholders on the list.' 59 If the takeover
had been hostile, Bendix would not have been able to gain access to
the shareholder list. In the end result, Bendix acquired 97,300 shares
in one month, whereas previously Bendix had spent one year acquir-
ing only a small number of floating shares. 6°
In contrast, in 1972, Okinawa Electric Power, Co. carried out the
first takeover by a Japanese corporation and the second takeover ever
in Japan. 61 At that time, various public utility companies were oper-
ating in the Okinawa area with different utility rates and duplicated
utility facilities. 62 The Japanese government noticed the low effi-
ciency in the area and led the effort to rectify the situation. 63 Oki-
nawa Electric Power purchased five other electric companies. All six
companies were receptive to the Japanese government's objective, and
the target companies, along side Okinawa Electric Power, took an ac-
tive part in the tender offer effort. The management of the five target
corporations helped to persuade the potential sellers of the shares of
the takeover's purpose and benefit. 64 The result of the takeover was
the astonishing acquisition of 72.6% of Matsuoka Haiden and 100%
of the remaining four companies. 65
In comparing the Bendix case and the Okinawa case, it becomes
156. Id.
157. Matsuzawa, Kabushiki no Kdkai Kaitsuke Daiichigd wo Oete (Having Completed the
First Public Tender Offer), 595 COM. L. REV. 15, 19.
158. The tender offer representative is required by Japanese SEL § 10. Mergers and Acqui-
sitions Questions & Answers, supra note 151, at 80. Yamaichi Securities is one of the designated
securities firms officially licensed to be a tender offer agent. Japanese SEL, § 10, Law regard-
ing Securities Firms.
159. See Matsuzawa, supra note 157, at 18.
160. Undoubtedly also contributing to the success of the takeover was Bendix's offer to
purchase all the shares tendered regardless of satisfaction of the quota. Matsuzawa, supra note
157, at 19.
161. The Bendix case was the first takeover in Japan.
162. Yao, Okinawa Denryoku no Kabushiki Kdkai Kaitsuke no Gaiyd (Summary of Oki-
nawa Electric TOB), 724 COM. L. REV. 18 (1976).
163. Matsuzawa, supra note 157, at 136.
164. Yao, supra note 162, at 20.
165. Additional reasons contributed to the successful takeover: 1) a limited number of
investors had accumulated the shares of the involved companies, obviating the need to con-
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clear that the fact that Bendix was a foreign investor did not affect
any aspect of the tender offer. The Japanese SEL applies equally to
foreign investors and domestic investors including the advance notice
requirement. A minor exception was noted by a securities dealer who
was involved in the Bendix tender offer. The Japanese SEL requires
advance notice of tender offers which means that the involved parties
must keep the acquisition plan confidential before the notice require-
ment is fulfilled. 166 The fact that Bendix was a foreign corporation
with headquarters overseas, and the transaction involved dealings in
two languages, resulted in an increase in the number of people in-
volved. 167 However, this only goes to the degree of effort necessary to
keep the tender offer confidential.
IV. NON-LEGAL BARRIERS IN JAPAN: THE
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Numerous commentators have accurately identified that despite
the so-called "liberalization" of laws regulating foreign investments,
non-legal cultural barriers still remain. One commentator noted that
"there are already so many natural barriers to takeovers that legal
restrictions are hardly needed."1 68
The main non-legal barrier to acquisitions is the shareholding
pattern in Japan's corporate world which is relevant in two respects.
First, shares held in stable shareholders' hands are unavailable to the
public. A large number of shares resting in the hands of these stable
shareholders leave fewer shares floating, making it difficult for outside
investors to purchase enough shares to carry out a tender offer. Sec-
ond, corporate shares in Japan are often crossheld. Cross-sharehold-
ing occurs when two companies which do business together hold each
other's shares. Cross-shareholding is used to strengthen the relation-
ship between the two companies as well as to discourage any takeover
attempts. Such shareholding patterns also leaves less floating shares
available for the potential investors.
vince a large number of shareholders; 2) the offered purchase price was 2.3 to 2.8 times the face
value which made it very attractive for the shareholders to sell. Yao, supra note 162, at 18.
166. See, Matsuzawa, "TOB Daiichigd" no Tanjd no Haikei to Igi (The Meaning and the
Background of the Birth of the First TOB), 590 COM. L. REV. 336; see also, Matsuzawa, supra
note 157, at 1.
167. Id.
168. Crampe & Benes, supra note 26, at 71; Comment, Adequate Remedies for Tender
Offer Abuse, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 209 (1987); CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS,
supra note 4, at 56.
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A few legal restrictions are imposed against the shareholding
practices which keep the shares away from outside investors. The ef-
fect, however, is minimal because of the restrictions' limited scope.
One restriction imposed by the Japanese Commercial Code section
210169 prohibits corporations from holding their own shares except
temporarily upon merging.' 70 In the United States, stock buyback is
an effective way to defend against takeover bids 171 because a corpora-
tion may demand a higher price on shares or restrict the number of
available shares. Further, the Japanese Commercial Code section
210, subsection 2 prohibits subsidiaries from holding the parent cor-
poration's shares. 172 The legislators sought to prevent corporations
from manipulating the prices of their own shares by using inside in-
formation to gain advantage over other shareholders.
173
Recently some Japanese corporations in order to protect them-
selves against possible takeovers have developed strategies which de-
liberately leave fewer shares available. 174 For example, Jidosha Kiki
had only a small number of floating shares available for outside inves-
tors. This was precisely why it was extremely difficult for Bendix to
acquire shares in the Japanese open market.
Major stable shareholders are financial institutions 75 which own
169. SH6H6 (Commercial Code) § 210 Law No. 48, March 9, 1899 as amended in Com-
mercial Code Amendment Law No. 74, 1981. The Commercial Code section 211 allows for an
"appropriate period of time" to dispose the shares. Most of the companies dispose of the
shares by cancelling them. Kawamura, Kigy6 Baishii Teikei no Kenshti to Bunseki Kigyd
Teikei to ni Kansuru Ankito Chi sa wo Mite (Analysis and Testing of Corporate Merger and
Acquisition, Joint Venture: Analysis on Questionnaire regarding Corporate Joint Venture and
Others), 1069 CoM. L. REV. 19, 23 (1986).
170. The Japanese Commercial Code section 210 is interpreted to mean that it applies with
equal force where a wholly owned subsidiary bought the shares of the parent corporation. For
a case reinforcing this view, see, Mizuno v. Mitsui Kdzan News, 1078 CoM. L. REV. 920 (1986)
(reporting a shareholder recovered damages caused by the subsidiary corporation buying back
its parent corporation's shares at a higher price). See also, Okumiya, Kabukaishime to Mitsui
Kozan Jiken Hanketsu no Hamon (Share Acquisition and the Extent of Mitsui Kozan Case),
1079 COM. L. REV. 972 (1986). The Japanese Commercial Code allows a corporation to take
up to 20% of all its issued stock in pledge. SH6H6 art. 211-12, para. 1; Kanzaki & Tatsuta,
Major Statutory Amendments in Japan in 1981, 5 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 259
(1983).
171. Amerika ni Okeru Jisha-kabu Kaimodoshi no Ugoki (Stock Buyback in the United
States), 1079 COM. L. REV. 1079 (1986).
172. SHOH6 § 210, para. 2. This prohibition applies when the parent holds more than
50% of the stock of the subsidiary. Kanzaki & Tatsuta, supra note 170.
173. SHOH6 § 210.
174. Round Table Discussion, 894 CoM. L. REV. 6 (1981). Cross shareholding by compa-
nies is a powerful defense to takeovers. Id.
175. E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1985, at 9, 14.
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39% of the shares of Japanese companies. Financial institutions in
Japan yield considerable power over the corporations in which they
hold shares because they play a major role in the financing of those
corporations. Japanese financial institutions are responsible for fi-
nancing nearly all Japanese corporations. 176 In fact, only 12% of the
financing is done through bond issue and stock increase.
1 77
Recent developments in Japanese law may change the power
structure in Japanese corporate governance. The extent of the
change, however, is unknown at this point. For instance, section 11
of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law requires banks and insurance
companies to reduce holdings of shares in any corporation to 5% and
10% respectively.17 8 The grace period for compliance with the sec-
tion expired in December, 1987. As a result, significant amount of
stocks previously held by banks and insurance companies may have
176. Major financial insutitions provide more than 80% of the capital for Japanese corpo-
rations. 22 MERGERS & ACQuISITIONs, 81, 85 (1987).
177. Id.
178. Antimonopoly Act, § 11; See, Watanabe, Gaikoku Gaisha ni yoru nihon Kigyd no
Kabushiki Shoyd to Dokusen Kinshi-Hd (Shareholding of Japanese Corporate Shares by Foreign
Corporations and Antitrust Act), 719 COM. L. REv. 22-26 (1975). Other anti-monopoly issues
are outside the scope of this Comment, and will not be discussed. Where a foreign corporation
acquires shares in an existing Japanese corporation, the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and
Maintenance of Fair Trade Act (the "Act") governs anti-monopoly concerns. SHITEKI
DOKUSEN NO KINSHI OYOBI K6SEI TORIHIKI NO KAKUHO NI KANSURU H6RITSU (Prohibi-
tion of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade Act), Law No. 54 of 1947 (translated
in Matsuo, Mergers and Acquisitions under Japanese Law, in 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 92, 1011
(1983)) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act]. Generally, a market share of 25% or above steps into
the range governed by the Antimonopoly Act. Kaisha no Gappei tono Shinsa ni Kansuru Jimu
Shori Kijun (Standards for Review of Corporate Mergers), Japan Fair Trade Commission
[guidelines] No. 3, July 15, 1980, cited in lyori, supra note 14, at 56, 77 & n.45. Under section
10 of the Act, acquisition of shares by a foreign corporation may not unreasonably restrain
trade in any particular field. Antimonopoly Act, § 10. A corporation may not engage in un-
fair business practices in acquiring shares. Id. Further, section 9 of the Act prohibits the
establishment and operation of a holding company, Japanese or foreign. Id. § 9. The Act
defines holding company as a company whose principal business is to control another corpora-
tion or corporations through stockholding. Id.; Matsuo, supra, at 1014. However, where the
holding company is foreign, enforcing the regulation may involve jurisdictional problems.
Matsushita, supra note 13, at 375. The Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") is the organi-
zational body charged with investigating and setting guidelines for mergers and acquisitions
with possible antimonopoly problems. See, Matsuo supra; see also, lyori, supra note 14, at 56,
77 & n.45. The JFTC requires filing of agreement or contract within thirty days. The JFTC
reporting requirements include: (1) international agreement or contract involving more than
a single transaction by filing a copy of the agreement or a contract (even though this require-
ment does not apply where the foreign corporation is in a financial business). Antimonopoly
Act, § 6; (2) a foreign company intending to acquire control of a Japanese company. Id.; and
(3) annual reports on holding of the Japanese corporation's shares. Id. § 10(2). The An-
timonopoly Act section 11 grace period ended December 1, 1987.
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become available to the general investment community. However,
one commentator speculated that banks will simply transfer the
shares held over the statutory limit to affiliate companies.179 Although
it is too early to accurately assess the movement of the shares, those
shares will remain unavailable for outside investors to purchase.
The power in Japanese companies resides with a president, a di-
rector or directors of the corporation because of their positions as
family members of the founder or the previous leader of the Japanese
corporation. 180 From a capitalistic point of view, it is hard to compre-
hend such allocation of power when the officers and directors do not
necessarily own shares in the company. In Japan, however, loyalty,
knowledge of the company and the trust earned over the years all
count heavily and translate into power. Such a concept of corporate
control differs greatly from that found in the United States where the
number of shares equals the amount of power one has in a corpora-
tion. The clash between the non-capitalistic philosophy and the capi-
talist mentality of the tender-offeror and the offeree creates an
effective non-legal barrier.
Another restriction limiting the power of shareholders is the Jap-
anese Commercial Code section 241, paragraph 3. This law requires
that a corporation holding more than 25% of the stocks in another
corporation be restricted in its voting rights. 18
Another unique aspect of Japanese corporations is their high
debt ratio, which is higher than ones seen in United States corpora-
tions. This makes Japanese corporations attractive targets.18 2 Two
factors enhance this attractiveness. The first factor is the skyrocket-
ing prices of real estate in the Tokyo business district. In the last
couple of years, soaring property values have tripled and quadrupled
the assets of Japanese companies. 8 3 In general, Japanese corporate
shares are undervalued in relation to the real estate holdings.18 4 Thus,
the increase in the value of real estate has adjusted the prices of
shares. Notwithstanding these trends, shares in such corporations
may still be a good investment. The second factor is that financial
179. Chaimoku Sareru Kinytikikan no Kabushiki Shobun (Destination of Financial Institu-
tion-held Shares), 1080 COM. L. REV. 1039 (1986).
180. E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 1985, at 14.
181. SHrH6, § 241, para. 3; Kanzaki & Tatsuta, supra note 170, at 260.
182. See, Nakamura, Kinyti-Kikan no Kabushiki-Hoyti Kisei ni Tsuite (On Financial Insti-
tution Shareholding), 1083 COM. L. REV. 43 (1986).
183. See Hiltzik, supra note 17.
184. Id.
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institutions in Japan are stepping up their effort to improve their debt
ratio. 185 One example of this is that banks are offering shares to in-
crease capital. While some business people voice concern about the
effectiveness of equity increasing mechanisms, the Japanese corpora-
tions are apparently ready to deal in a more liquid market.186 As a
consequence, if banks successfully carry out a tender offer, the reward
may indeed be high.
187
Are the Japanese ready to defend takeovers if foreign investors
decide to realize their takeover plans? At a glance, corporate Japan
seems well prepared to defend against unsolicited tender offers. Ques-
tionnaires, directed to both listed and unlisted corporations and dis-
tributed by a securities house in Japan, indicated that almost 70% of
the companies are, in some way, prepared for takeovers. 18 Accord-
ing to this questionnaire, the two most popular defenses against take-
overs are securing stable shareholders and monitoring the stock
market for fluctuations indicating takeover possibilities. Among un-
listed corporations surveyed, the most popular defense was the restric-
tion of sale or transfer of shares. 189 However, this will not protect
them if closed corporations later choose to do public offerings because
listed corporations are not allowed to restrict sale of shares.' 90
Despite the result of the above survey, many corporations in
Japan are not in fact adequately prepared. Japanese corporations for
the most part are vulnerable to takeovers. However, it is important to
be aware of the peculiar realities of Japanese businesses such as: a)
vertical and horizontal business relationships among employees in a
company and among corporations; b) years of interaction among busi-
ness acquaintances fostered by the life long employment structure;
and c) the Japanese government's procurement policies. Also, as seen
185. Interview with Kenji Uchida, General Manager, Mergers & Acquisitions, Cosmo Se-
curities Co., Ltd. and Yoshihisa Miyanaga, Managing Director, Est Co., Ltd., in Los Angeles,
California (Sept. 2, 1987).
186. Id.
187. However, what is commonly known as "Tateho shock" may be a good example of a
liquid market trend going awry. Tateho Chemical Corporation ("Tateho") was a ceramics
manufacturer in which the operation had not been very profitable. Asahi Shinbun, Oct. 8,
1987, at 14. The managers started dealing in stocks to make a quick profit and the scheme was
unsuccessful. Tateho nearly went bankrupt. "Tateho shock" became a deterrent to Japanese
business' preoccupation with the "zai tech (finance technology)." Id.; see also, Tateho Kagaku
Kjgyd no Zai-teku Shippai (Failure of Tateho Chemical Industries' Finance Technology), 1122
COM. L. REV. 51 (1987).
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in the Newpis case, Japanese corporations can easily solicit allies
among government branches and business partners' 91 to ward off un-
solicited tender offers. These factors carry considerable weight when
contemplating tender offers in Japan. For instance, in the Minebea
case, Trafalger-Glen, the offeror, was unable to obtain a statutory-
required tender offer representative; this detrimentally affected the
deal.192 This was caused by Trafalger-Glen proceeding with the take-
over as if they were unaware of the importance of having allies in
Japanese business circles. Not only did they fail to solicit a Japanese
security house in advance, but later Daiwa Securities refused to be
their takeover representative. 193
The above illustrates that when doing business in Japan, it is vital
to create a good relationship with the government. 194 It is well known
that ministries (such as the Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry) and industries often act in concert in shaping policy goals. In
certain instances, the government even gets production quotas. 195
Thus, it is possible to set policies which are favorable to particular
parties.
Similarly, the presence of various government branches in partic-
ular transactions may also influence the way the transactions turn
out. For instance, in both the Bendix 9 6 and Okinawa 197 cases, the
appropriate government branches closely watched the process. In
Okinawa, the government even formed Okinawa Electric Committee
to monitor the acquisition. 198 There is no doubt that the government
interest in the project lent a certain amount of legitimacy in the trans-
action, thereby facilitating the solicitation process for the purchaser.
Lobbying and past relationships have also been known to influence
the government's position under certain circumstances. 199 Conse-
191. The Japanese business community is a tight network of keiretsu companies and fur-
ther tied in contractor-subcontractor relationships. Hoshino, The Performance of Corporate
Mergers in Japan, J. Bus. FIN. ACCT. 153 (1982). Keiretsu companies are a family of compa-
nies. Henderson, supra note 6, at 144.
192. M. MIYAZAKI, supra note 85, at 75.
193. Id.
194. See Smith, supra note 26, at 417.
195. This elicits criticism from the public called yuchaku, where officials and businesses
develop a "you scratch my back, I scratch your back relationship."
196. See supra text accompanying notes 151-60.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
198. Yao, supra note 162.
199. Katakura Kdgyd no Shin Gaitame Hd ni yoru Kokuji Shobun Torikeshi Seikyzi Jiken
no Sojd (Demand to Withdraw the FECL Listing of Katakura Kdgyo), 899 CoM. L. REV. 30
(1981).
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quently, taking a position against government policy or guidance is
strongly discouraged. In other words, in Japan's homogeneous soci-
ety, taking an adversarial stance may not serve one well.
200
Culturally, it cannot be ignored that the idea of taking over an-
other corporation is inherently an uncomfortable proposition to the
Japanese. 20 1 Most sectors of the Japanese market remain de facto off
limits to foreign investors. This has been the case through five stages
of the "so-called" liberalization process in the area of foreign trade
and investments in Japan. The attitude of the Japanese people plays a
part in the perpetuation of these barriers. 20 2 However, to explain the
resistance solely on the basis of cultural differences is to ignore the
reality of the Newpis case. If the government faithfully followed the
letter of the law, Katakura Industries would not have been designated
as off-limits by the government. Hence, it is not entirely cultural bar-
riers which keep the potential investors away, but also the law and its
applications discourage investors.
V. CONCLUSION
Japanese business people are rapidly educating themselves in
mergers and acquisitions. 20 3 In 1986 alone, Japanese corporations ac-
counted for twenty-seven acquisitions worth almost two billion dol-
200. Even behavior that attracts attention may be undesirable. A Japanese psychologist
comments that in a Japanese company, employees who seem shy and do not speak out do
better than an aggressive and outspoken manager. Address by Professor Robert Ballon, JE-
TRO Business Round Table Meeting (Jun. 18, 1981), reprinted in Decision-Making in Japan:
The Real vs. the Conceptual Process, Speaking of Japan, Sept. 1981, at 22.
201. A question posed directly to the point, why are there so few takeovers in Japan,
elicited the following answer: "because it is rude." (Conversation with Professor S. Mura-
matsu, a professor of business at Seikei University, Tokyo, Japan. (1987))
202. If there is anything advantageous which comes out of the Japanese culture, it's the
lack of litigiousness. Since the Japanese prefer to resort to arbitration and other alternate
methods of dispute resolution, shareholder suits are not commonly brought in Japan. Conse-
quently, in Japan, a potential purchaser is relatively free from the risk of shareholder suits.
However, some commentators note that commercial litigation in Japan is on the decrease due
to "distrust of decisions based on legal principles." Shapiro, Can the Japanese Lack of Lig-
tigousness Continue, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, 25, 30 (1983).
203. "M & A" has become a Japanese term and is used interchangeably with "kigyj kyi-
shu gappei" (corporate mergers and acquisitions). Feverish M & A education takes on a form
of lectures and speeches as well as trips. For example, Technology Tour, Inc. recently organ-
ized a trip to the United States for a group of businessmen to study mergers and acquisitions
by visiting lawyers, financial institutions, and businesses that were involved in recent mergers
and/or acquisitions. See, Tekunologi Toransufd Kenkytijo, M & A Tekunolog[Hibi Chdsadan
(M & A Technology Research Group) (1987).
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lars in the United States. 2°4 The stigma that accompanied mergers
and acquisitions in Japan has decreased. The image of nottoriya,
20 5
once attached to mergers and acquisitions, is disappearing. 20 6 Japa-
nese securities houses have been setting up merger and acquisition
teams, and major United States law firms have been rushing to open
Tokyo offices or establish working relationships with existing Japa-
nese law firms. Various United States investment banks and account-
ing firms are also trying to establish a market for Japanese businesses.
Hence, potential foreign investors seem to have all the tools required
to initiate a takeover bid.
Unfortunately, not only legal barriers remain in the way of inter-
ested foreign investors, but also the nature and philosophy of Japa-
nese corporations. While a great deal of discrimination against
foreign interests comes from non-legal forces inside and outside of the
Japanese government, until the Japanese law is amended to preclude
the chance of bureaucratic manipulation, foreign interests will have to
pay a prohibitive price to begin investing in Japan.
Hisako Muramatsu
204. M & A in Japan: Halting Steps Toward a New Era, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 85
(1987).
205. Nottoriya is someone who forcibly takes over a business.
206. Kawamura, supra note 169, at 23.
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